[Smt-talk] Classical Form and Recursion
Dmitri Tymoczko
dmitri at Princeton.EDU
Fri Apr 17 07:24:07 PDT 2009
On Apr 16, 2009, at 12:48 AM, Fred Lerdahl wrote:
> The competence-performance issue is not important to me, or
> generally to practitioners of cognitive science in language or
> music, except as a marker of the study a mental capacity according
> to certain simplifying idealizations. The value of the results
> reveals the usefulness of the idealizations. Dmitri questions the
> idealizations but offers nothing in return. Meanwhile progress is
> being made using them.
"The value of the results reveals the usefulness of the
idealizations" -- if this means "match of theory with experiment
always proves that a model is correct," it's false. Science is
(unfortunately for us!) more difficult than that.
Ptolemeic astronomy explained the motion of the planets using
epicycles -- circular orbits within circular orbits, all centered
around the earth. It fit the data pretty well, but was completely
wrong. It held sway for hundreds of years -- during which much
progress was made on the theory. Students learned it from their
teachers without making objections. The question is whether TPS is
analogous -- a complicated theory that fits some data reasonably
well, but is based on incorrect assumptions. To ask this question is
not to attack you or cognitive science more generally; it's part of
the normal give-and-take of science. (Which nowadays can occur on
email lists as well as in published articles!) In fact, it's our
duty as responsible consumers of science to be tough on theories.
What I think I'm offering is a suggestion for an alternative
direction: construct a theory that is more realistic about human
perceptual abilities. Incorporate Cook's results about long-term
closure, Huron's about voice denumerability in polyphonic music, the
7 +/- 2 limits on short term memory, and so on. Or else, explain in
a more detailed way how TPS's assumption of complete perceptual
transparency is consistent with our demonstrated limitations in ear-
training experiments. This isn't a full-blown rival theory, to be
sure, but it is a suggestion about how to start constructing one.
> Dmitri seems to have trouble with two points that are foundational
> in cognitive science: the distinction between explicit and implicit
> knowledge, and the amazing complexity of implicit knowledge. Both
> points are beyond dispute within the field. It would be better to
> move on to issues that are indeed under investigation--for
> instance, the structures and principles involved in a capacity's
> mental representation (my interest), the role of statistical
> learning (see Huron, "Sweet Anticipation," Oxford, 2006), the
> different roles of representation and processing and their neural
> instantiation (Patel), or neuropsychological evidence of what music
> and language do and do not share (Peretz & Coltheart, 2003).
I recognize that some knowledge is implicit, and it is sometimes
complex, but this does not mean that every theory that proposes
complex implicit knowledge is correct. My worries about TPS arose
because I sensed a contrast between the idealizations in TPS and
those in other areas of cognitive science.
We could, if you wanted to, explore the contrast in more detail.
David Marr proposes various algorithms that explain how we construct
high-level 3D objects from low-level retinal sense data. We know
some such story must be right, because we do experience objects in a
3D world. Linguistics proposes rules by which we parse strings of
sounds to extract the meaning of sentences; we know that some such
story must be true because we do in fact understand what people say.
In neither case do these theories propose subconscious computations
with high-level data that go far beyond the sorts of abilities humans
can demonstrate in simple tests.
TPS proposes that we calculate "tension" by performing complex
unconscious calculations with very high-level data -- essentially,
the musical score. Unlike the cases mentioned above, there is no a
priori reason to think that some such story has to be true. We could
calculate tension in a more low-level way (based on timbre, loudness,
dissonance, etc.), or with different kinds of high-level data
(rhythm, schemas, etc.). Furthermore, the abilities it attributes to
us go far beyond what people can typically demonstrate in experiments
or ear-training tests. Students have trouble, even in very
simplified and controlled situations, identifying intervals
correctly. But TPS proposes that they do so effortlessly,
accurately, and at extremely high speed -- constructing on this basis
elaborate mental representations of musical structure.
Note also that when learning to see and speak, people have multiple
opportunities to receive feedback that helps them correct their
mental models. We move through the world, and this helps us improve
our abilities at edge-detection and object recognition. We speak and
listen to others, and this helps us improve our linguistic
perceptions. But many listeners receive no musical training
whatsoever. Furthermore, even if they receive training in
performance, this usually has nothing to do with developing the kinds
of models postulated in TPS. (Play this note now! Nope, that's a
little sharp! Whoops, your rhythm is wrong!) You never hear "your
model of the basic space has only four levels instead of five!" (And
indeed, if we like playing or listening to music, but have the
"wrong" mental model, it's not obvious what pressure there is to
change.) So TPS proposes that all listeners spontaneously converge
on the same set of complex unconscious high-level mental
representations, even without any explicit training -- or even
incentive -- that would help them do so.
These are specific reasons to worry about TPS in particular --
responding with general facts about science, or cognitive science in
particular, doesn't really address them. My one regret about ending
this discussion here is that I was hoping was to get you to explain
your particular responses to these kinds of issues. I suspect that
you have lots to say about these specific criticisms -- that you've
thought about them carefully, and have more to offer than simple
generalities about science or cognitive science. What I've been
trying to do, not totally successfully, is get you to share these
responses. Maybe some other time ...
DT
PS. For those of you listening in at home, here's a fascinating
subtext: Fred has perfect pitch and I don't. So we may have very
different ideas about what is and is not realistic to assume about
listeners!
Dmitri Tymoczko
Associate Professor of Music
310 Woolworth Center
Princeton, NJ 08544-1007
(609) 258-4255 (ph), (609) 258-6793 (fax)
http://music.princeton.edu/~dmitri
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